


Great be



ginnings.

These are ideas being born. They are the working drawings of Michelangelo Buonarroti. He tried to keep most of them hidden in his lifetime. Now you can see them, and many more, in "Michelangelo and His World: With Drawings from the British Museum" at The Pierpont Morgan Library in New York City from April 26 through July 28, 1979.

For more than 400 years, the world has stood in awe of his finished works. Now we can take delight in his great beginnings. He didn't do them to please us. He did them to explore his subject matter, and himself.

That's one reason we sponsored this exhibition. We can learn from great ideas, but we learn more from knowing how they came to be. Great works inspire us but the creative process nourishes us. In our work, as in yours, we need to be reminded that great endings start with great beginnings—that no beginning, in our day or in Michelangelo's, can be great without individual imagination, individual creativity, individual innovativeness. Sponsorship of art that reminds us of these things is not patronage. It's a business and human necessity.

If your company would like to know more about corporate sponsorship of art, write George Weissman, Chairman of the Board, Philip Morris Incorporated, 100 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017.

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"Michelangelo and His World: With Drawings from the British Museum" at The Pierpont Morgan Library appears from April 26 through July 28, 1979. Hours: 10:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday, Saturday; 10:30 a.m.-8:30 p.m. Thursday; 1:00 p.m.-5:00 p.m. Sunday. Special viewing by appointment on Monday. This exhibition has been made possible by generous support from Philip Morris Incorporated and the National Endowment for the Arts. Further support has been provided by the Federal Arts and Artifacts Indemnification Act.

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that the earlier U.S. arms-control decision not to try to ban MIRVs is now the stimulant for an entirely new ICBM.

U.S. negotiators in SALT II protected the right to develop the M-X, a larger, more accurate missile, with the intention of making it mobile so as to keep the Soviet Union guessing where it is stationed. Because of its multiple warhead capability, this missile will increase the threat to Soviet land-based missiles, make Soviet leaders more uneasy during a crisis, and stimulate them to match new U.S. technology. It will also make inspection of any future limitations much more difficult, thus decreasing the prospects for genuine strategic reductions if there should ever be a SALT III treaty. The decision to develop this new missile became a foregone conclusion as the negotiations proceeded, not because there was a security need for it, but because a payoff was needed for Pentagon officials to get their support for SALT II. Thus, the more arms-control negotiations appear to be serious and successful, the more rapidly the normal resistance to unnecessary new arms programs erodes, which is why "success at SALT" has meant an increase in military expenditures and destructive capability.

The promise of a SALT treaty in some cases has speeded up the rush toward more numerous and destructive weapons. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, for example, recently directed Air Force and civilian analysts to accelerate planning for the best way to deploy the M-X missile so that President Carter could announce plans for the more deadly intercontinental missile in time to help ease the way for Senate approval of the SALT II agreement. SALT II will also allow the development of the Trident submarine, the longer-range Trident missile, the cruise missile, and the neutron weapons. The SALT II ceilings on missile launchers are not sacrificial ones. The United States has not wanted more launchers (as opposed to warheads) than it now has, a level below the ceilings in SALT II. The Soviet Union will have to dismantle approximately 150 to 250 aging launchers, but it will more than compensate for these by adding hundreds of warheads to its other missiles.

In brief, SALT II legitimizes the

nuclear weapons below the ceilings, encourages building up to those ceilings, and, outside the ceilings, explicitly allows new weapons that will make future reductions more difficult. It fails to move the United States, the Soviet Union, other nuclear powers, and countries approaching nuclear capability closer to the renunciation of nuclear arms.

MOTIVATED by a desire to hold political ground against the advance of growing conservative forces, many people argue that advocates of arms reduction must work to ratify a relatively useless SALT II primarily because we later on want a more desirable SALT III. Yet this is an admission that SALT II is not worth the lobbying effort in itself. If that is so, we should lobby now for the comprehensive arms reductions that we unrealistically hope will be part of SALT III, and forget about SALT II. If such a lobbying effort were successful, SALT II would be passed easily. In other words, lobbying for a demilitarized global security system would, as a side effect, encourage the ratification of SALT II, but lobbying for SALT II will not give us comprehensive arms reductions.

Organizations with offices in Washington get easily caught up in counting votes to achieve legislative "victories," without careful assessment of whether a victory matters in the long run. A treaty ratification campaign offers a concrete goal, something useful for mobilizing constituents and contributors. It is exciting to have lunch with Washington influentials to plan strategy for a legislative battle. Those tasks are important, but *only* when the battle is over a fundamental issue, and SALT II definitely is not. Nonetheless, during 1978, leaders from labor unions, liberal lobbying groups, and almost all peace organizations joined the SALT bandwagon.

Unfortunately, a campaign to ratify SALT II will lead the public into the mistaken belief that the best road to genuine arms reductions is through negotiations similar to SALT I and SALT II. Yet this approach will not produce a demilitarized security system because it aims to manage the arms competition, not to terminate it. Negotiators—no matter how well-in-

tioned—cannot reduce arms substantially at the same time that they rely heavily on them for security and diplomatic influence. Arms can be significantly reduced only when security can be achieved through means that do not depend so completely on national military forces. This requires us to think seriously not about piecemeal, stopgap measures of arms stabilization or control within the present international system, which is a war system based on the threat or use of force, but about steps to take toward the creation of an alternative security system.

A transnational monitoring agency that includes third parties is an essential part of any long-range policy to increase security while decreasing dependence on arms. Yet with characteristic arrogance the U.S. and Soviet governments act as if they were the only two governments in the world that have a right to monitor their nuclear postures—postures that cannot avoid affecting every inhabitant of the planet. Nor is it any credit to our NATO allies that they allow the United States to take this position. The verification of SALT II could be carried out by a global, multilateral agency. Establishing such an agency would be a positive accomplishment. Even with such an agency for monitoring SALT II, the United States could still maintain national means of verification to reassure those who might doubt the reliability of the global agency during its infancy. But because it has no long-range policy for arms reductions, and despite the absence of any reasonable argument against this idea, the United States refuses initiatives in this direction.

Far from strengthening international peacekeeping organizations and increasing their representativeness, SALT II advances the system of great-power dominance over the economically and militarily less-powerful societies. The attitudes supporting SALT II will, in my opinion, someday be seen as a late-twentieth-century manifestation of old-fashioned imperialism. The Big Two, which produce ever-greater military fruits despite détente, hold most of the world's population hostage to the threat of instant genocide. Moreover, the world's people are subjected to taxation without representation—through the worldwide, negative economic consequences of unnecessary military expenditures. Much of the world's popu-

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